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Although the macroprudential regulation only became a central topic of bank regulation after 2008, 
recognising and analysing risk, what now we call macroprudential, has formed part of the thinking 
about banking risk for a long time. A real turn of events was caused by the Global Financial Crisis. 
Since then, as a consequence of the huge taxpayers’ burden and the mutual reinforcing effect of 
sovereign and banking crises, the main course of bank regulation has become the elaboration and 
implementation of regulation with a macroprudential perspective. This article reviews the history 
of the international evolution of macroprudential regulation from the perspective of both the regula-
tion’s motivations and its conceptual and practical developments. Its main focus is the development 
of the ideas of a macroprudential perspective on prudential policy and the way these ideas eventu-
ally led to concrete experiences with macroprudential regulatory tools. As a conclusion, the author 
raises the question of whether the fi nancial system has become more stable by implementing the 
current form of macroprudential regulation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a consequence of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a significant shift in 
perspectives in the area of bank regulation can be observed. Besides the earlier 
regulation that was microprudential, i.e. it had in mind the stability of individu-
al institutions, the defining characteristic of the regulatory changes today is the 
emergence of a macroprudential perspective, i.e. the formation of a bank regula-
tion that additionally has in mind the risks building up in the financial system as 
a whole.
The risks called macroprudential in today’s terminology have been known 
for a long time: the build-up process of cyclical financial risks and the subse-
quent financial crises are quite well documented, going back several hundred 
years. Even so, until the GFC, the evolution of bank regulation was dominated 
by the expectation to protect against the microprudential risks that had been 
identified and measured increasingly more precisely. The motivation for estab-
lishing the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1975 was the creation 
of a consistent bank regulation that is equally valid for everyone, is competi-
tively neutral on the international level, and acts against the banks’ identically 
measured and handled individual risks. The international financial institutions 
and several academics realised the existence and significance of macropruden-
tial risks only as a consequence of the big financial crises in the late 1990s, the 
Asian and Russian crisis, and the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment (LTCM)1. However, the macroprudential perspective did not gain ground 
in bank regulation at the time, and the central concern of regulation continued 
to be the development of rules focusing on individual institutional risks. The 
so-called Basel II bank regulation system – published in 1999 in its first version 
and applied from 2007 – built on the banks’ best practices in risk management 
to an important extent. Thus, it inherently had a microprudential perspective. 
The macroprudential turn was brought by the GFC. The shock caused by the 
GFC made all stakeholders realise that the main causes of financial crises were 
macroprudential risks. Following the GFC, new institutions supporting mac-
roprudential regulation and supervision were created. The Basel III regulation 
package as well as the European and national regulations based on it supple-
1  Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund founded in 1993 and hallmarked 
by two American economists, Robert Merton and Myron Scholes, who received the Nobel 
Prize for their results in the area of derivatives pricing. LTCM was looking for arbitrage op-
portunities using a model developed for this purpose, and they made a huge profit in the first 
years of operation. By 1998, the time of the Russian crisis, the models applied by LTCM have 
become general professional practice, and that has amplified the effects of the crisis to a great 
extent (Dunbar 2000). 
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mented the regulatory system with numerous macroprudential elements. Mac-
roprudential regulation was thought to become a “wonder weapon” that would 
help to avoid future financial crises.
This paper reviews the history of the evolution of macroprudential regulation 
from the perspective of both the regulation’s motivations and its conceptual and 
practical development on an international and European level. Its focus is the de-
velopment of the ideas of macroprudential perspective on prudential policy and 
the way these ideas eventually led to concrete experiences with macroprudential 
regulatory tools. Its structure is as follows: Section 2 reviews the history of iden-
tifying macroprudential risks and appearance of the macroprudential perspective. 
Section 3 presents the macroprudential turn that occurred as a consequence of the 
GFC; the structure of the institutions established for supporting macroprudential 
regulation and the newly created macroprudential regulatory system. Section 4 
concludes and raises the question of whether the banking system has become 
more stable after the macroprudential turn.
2. THE APPEARANCE OF THE MACROPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
BEFORE THE GFC
Although macroprudential risks and the macroprudential bank regulation came 
into the centre of attention of both academics and practical experts in bank regu-
latory policies as a consequence of the GFC, we can hardly claim that the reason 
for this increased attention was the novelty of the risks.
2.1. Early identifi cations of macroprudential risks 
Well before the GFC, it was possible to identify the macroprudential risks as the 
reason of numerous systemic financial and banking crises. Analysing the causes 
of the Great Depression of 1929–1933, Irving Fisher (1933) already considered 
the build-up of systemic risks, although without giving it a specific name. How-
ever, the cyclical nature of lending (or, to use the current expression, procycli-
cality) formed an integral part of his reasoning. According to historian Charles 
Kindleberger, financial crises unfolded roughly every 10 years in the last 400 
years (Kindleberger 1993: 264). Kindleberger elaborated on the theories of Fisher 
(1933) and Hyman Minsky (1986). He regarded the financial crises as bubble-
based crisis, in which excessive credit expansion played a big role. In the two 
big and famous financial crises of the early 18th century documented by him, the 
South Sea Bubble in England and the Mississippi Bubble in France, the creation 
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and bursting of the bubble, based on share prices and financed by the bank, had 
an equally big role (Kindleberger 2001). They emerged on the systemic level 
and affected the financial system and the economy of the entire country, i.e. they 
conformed to the currently used notion of macroprudential risks. 
After the liberalisation of the financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
international contagion of financial and banking crises gave a new impetus to the 
analysis of systemic crises. As a result of the Latin American, Scandinavian, and 
Central and Eastern European banking crises in the earlier 1990s, especially fol-
lowing the so-called Tequila Crisis in Mexico in 1994–1995, several important 
studies covered the definition of banking crises and the identification of their 
causes, with a particular focus on the causes leading to systemic crises. At the 
same time, academics and international financial institutions started to build the 
databases of the banking crises’ occurrences, during which they took into account 
systemic banking crises, applying various definitions (see for example: Lindgren 
et al. 1996; Caprio – Kinglebiel 1996). However, despite the emergence of mac-
roprudential approaches to financial stability, there were no signs of recommen-
dations to move towards developing and integrating macroprudential regulatory 
tools in bank regulation. 
The appearance of the macroprudential perspective is shown by the fact that 
the Bank of England, first among the central banks, published its Financial Sta-
bility Report in 1996 (Bank of England 1996), focusing on the banking and fi-
nancial system’s vulnerabilities. However, the publication of stability reports by 
central banks only became an internationally standard practice in the early 2000s, 
following the crises at the end of the 1990s.
Clement (2011) documents the first appearances of the term “macroprudential”. 
The expression initially appeared exclusively in internal working documents of 
central bankers, particularly of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and 
the Bank of England at the end of the 1970s. Clement links the first public ap-
pearance of the term to the BIS report about international banking innovations in 
1986. The usage of the expression was sporadic until the end of the 1990s. 
2.2. Evolution of the macroprudential perspective: the period between the end 
of the 1990s and the GFC
The Asian crisis in 1997, then the Russian crisis in 1998, and especially the col-
lapse of LTCM that was closely linked to the latter, fundamentally changed the 
thinking on the banking crises. The interconnectedness of financial markets and 
the contagion effect as a consequence of it, the prevalence of herd behaviour, the 
uniform risk management systems, and particularly the application of models and 
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limits dictating identical behavioural rules as the root cause of the systemic bank-
ing crises became an important part of common professional thinking. Simultane-
ously, there was a change in the terminology: besides “systemic risks”, the use of 
the expression “macroprudential risks” became increasingly more frequent, and 
regarding bank regulation and supervision, the concept of macroprudential regu-
lation focusing on systemic risks appeared as a counterpoint to the so-called mi-
croprudential regulation focusing on individual banks (Clement 2011: 63–65). 
The speech by Andrew Crockett (2000), the then General Manager of the BIS, 
delivered in September 2000 at the XIth International Conference of Banking Su-
pervisors was considered a milestone. In this speech, he distinguished between 
the macro- and microprudential dimensions of financial stability based on their 
objectives and the principles of their mechanism of action, underscoring that this 
differentiation did not necessarily mean that the two types of dimensions should 
use different regulatory and supervisory tools. He defined the macroprudential 
objective as decreasing the social costs of a financial crisis, and the micropruden-
tial objective as decreasing the probability of the bankruptcy of individual institu-
tions. In a macroprudential dimension, the principle of the mechanism of action is 
determined by the collective reactions of individuals and institutions, i.e. it should 
be considered endogenous. In a microprudential dimension, the risks are external 
for the financial institutions and the reactions are individual, i.e. exogenous. In 
his speech, Crockett noted that it would be justified to impose higher prudential 
requirements on the largest institutions with an importance from a systemic risk 
perspective and that preparations for worse times should be made in the periods 
of economic upturn, building up additional capacities for protection. This means 
that the prudential requirements, which were calibrated with a microprudential 
perspective in the same way for all institutions and were sized independently of 
the characteristics of the cycle, were not appropriate because they do not handle 
macroprudential risks.
Less than a month later, BIS organised the annual conference of central bank 
economists, “Marrying the macro- and microprudential dimensions of financial 
stability” (BIS 2001). The background paper for the conference was prepared 
by the BIS economists (Borio et al. 2001), and they focused on the problem of 
the build-up of macroprudential risks in time, namely on the procyclicality of 
financial intermediation, which means that financial institutions do not take into 
consideration to a sufficient extent the risks related to the changes of economic 
cycles: in good times they underestimate, and in bad times they overestimate 
them. The BIS experts argued that if the banks accumulated extra provisions and 
capital in the periods of economic upturn that would greatly promote financial 
stability. They considered four policy options for the actual implementation: 
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(a) promoting the market participants to better understand the real nature and 
the build-up in time of the risks; 
(b) empowering the supervisory authorities with discretional instruments in 
order to decrease the procyclicality (in the form of increasing the capital and/or 
provisions); 
(c) imposing mandatory regulatory, supervisory, and accounting rules, defined 
as a function of an economic variable; and 
(d) using the monetary policy toolset.
After assessing the advantages and disadvantages, they found that the most 
effective solution would be the introduction of mandatory prudential rules, pri-
marily in the form of provisioning requirements. Thus, we can say that this paper 
already contained the regulatory ideas that have since become integral parts of 
the objective and instruments of bank regulation much later, after the GFC, as 
part of Basel III.
A study by Borio (2003), the then Chief Economist at the BIS, gave further 
clarifications. It contained the full range of the concepts and targets used today. 
On the one hand, it distinguished between the two dimensions of macropruden-
tial risks, the cross-sectional and the time dimension, where the time dimension 
represents the procyclicality of risks and the cross-sectional dimension represents 
the risk concentrations existing at a given point in time (either the same risk expo-
sure at several institutions or due to the large size of individual institutions). On 
the other hand, it also defined the micro- and macroprudential approach to bank 
regulation. Table 1 containing the comparison is regarded as the starting point by 
numerous analyses related to this topic and it appears in later BIS materials and 
other research papers as well (BIS 2008; Maes 2010; Borio 2011; Damodoran – 
Lee 2014; etc.).
Table 1. The macro- and microprudential perspectives compared
Macroprudential Microprudential
Proximate objective Limit financial system-wide 
distress
Limit distress of individual 
institutions
Ultimate objective Avoid output (GDP) costs Consumer (Investor/Depositor) 
protection
Model of risk (in part) Endogenous Exogenous
Correlations and common 
exposures across institutions
Important Irrelevant
Calibration of prudential 
controls
In terms of system-wide 
distress; Top-Down
In terms of risks of individual 
institutions; Bottom-Up
Source: Borio (2003: 2).
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In accordance with the definitions used earlier by Crockett (2000), Borio 
(2003) distinguished between the macro- and microprudential perspectives not 
based on the types of regulatory tools, but on the regulatory objectives as well 
as the properties of the methods used for measuring and controlling risks. Ac-
cordingly, the same regulatory tool may be applicable for controlling either the 
micro- or the macroprudential risks.
The interesting part of the conceptual and analytic work performed at the BIS 
presented above is that the approach and the results were not included in the most 
important ongoing project of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: the 
Basel II capital rules. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
operating next to the BIS published the first version of the Basel II capital rules 
in June 1999. The first version, intended to be final, was published in June 2004, 
after a long consultation period. It had a dominantly microprudential perspec-
tive because the perspective change compared to Basel I was that it built on the 
banks’ best practices in risk awareness and risk management. Instead of the ear-
lier regulation that was valid for everyone and had to be applied mechanically, 
Basel II introduced a three-pillar regulation. The first pillar, which determines 
the minimum capital requirement, makes it possible for the banks having higher 
risk awareness and better risk management systems to apply capital calculation 
rules that build more strongly on their own risk management practices, which is 
inherently microprudential. In the framework of the second pillar, the supervisory 
review process, the supervisory authority checks the banks’ adequacy of internal 
capital calculation, that is the adequacy of capital allocation from a micropruden-
tial perspective. Under the third pillar, banks have to disclose information related 
to their risk profile, risk management, and the corresponding capital requirement, 
that is in a microprudential perspective.
The probable reason for this duality is that Basel II has been worked out not 
due to the crises in the later 1990s, but owing to the shortcomings of the earlier 
regulation. Even so, two not particularly powerful signs of the macroprudential 
perspective can be found in the internal rating-based methods of the first pil-
lar. These are the “downturn LGD” and the “through the cycle PD”, as supple-
ments to the yearly perspective of the PD and LGD.2 However, these elements are 
not dominant parts of the regulation, they are present in Basel II more as “good 
wishes” rather than strong anticyclical elements due to their low level of elabora-
tion (the lack of related calibration principles and standards). Beyond that, the 
requirement to perform a stress test does show up in multiple places among the 
2  The PD (Probability of Default) and the LGD (Loss Given Default) are the parameters of the 
model, which determine the regulatory capital requirement under the internal rating based ap-
proach (IRB) of Basel II’s first pillar.
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second pillar provisions, but the calibration is essentially microprudential, in ac-
cordance with the general perspective of the regulation.
In this light, it is not surprising that Basel II was heavily criticised during the 
consultation period, even before its introduction, because it supported the procy-
clical behaviour of the banks given its essentially microprudential perspective. 
Altman – Saunders (2001) drew the attention to the retroactive perspective of 
the ratings to be used for determining the capital requirement, in case of both 
internal and external ratings. The researchers of the Financial Markets Group 
at the London School of Economics (LSE) criticised the planned regulation for 
the complete absence of a macroprudential perspective (Danielson et al. 2001). 
They pointed out that the models used by banks that will become accepted in the 
regulation through Basel II do not take into consideration the endogenous nature 
of risks, and that capital requirement based on ratings considerably amplifies the 
procyclicality of the regulation.
 Besides the BIS economists, the IMF also made many efforts in this period 
for spreading the macroprudential perspective. As a reaction to the Asian crisis, 
the finance ministers and governors of central banks of 22 developed countries 
with an internationally active financial system met in Washington in April 1998 
and decided to set up several working groups with the goal of elaborating rec-
ommendations for stabilising the international financial system. One of these 
examined the possible methods to strengthen the national financial systems. 
One of this working group’s recommendations was that the IMF should include 
the stability analysis of national financial systems in its regular country assess-
ments with a much greater emphasis than earlier, also integrating the World 
Bank’s professional expertise (Working Group on Strengthening the Financial 
Systems 1998). In accordance with the recommendation, the IMF launched the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), with the involvement of the 
World Bank, in May 1999, first as a pilot program, and later as a continuous and 
regular activity. From 2001, they started to publish regularly their country re-
ports based on the FSAPs. In order to substantiate and unify the FSAP method-
ology, the IMF elaborated a system of macroprudential indicators (MPIs) (IMF 
2000). The two large groups of the indicators defined in the MPI framework 
consisted of the indicators based on macro-statistics related to the financial sec-
tor and the aggregated microprudential indicators for the entire financial sector. 
With regard to the interpretation of the indicators, the paper repeatedly drew 
attention to the importance of stress tests built on possible negative macroeco-
nomic scenarios.
As a result of the continuous analysis and development of the MPIs, the IMF 
published the system of Financial Stability Indicators (FSI) in 2002 (IMF 2002). 
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The system consisted of a standard and comparable, so-called core set3 and a 
not completely standard, so-called encouraged (or additional) set4 of indicators. 
Since then the indicators have been regularly analysed by the IMF as part of the 
country assessments and the FSAP.
During this period, the appreciation of the responsibility for financial stabil-
ity significantly grew in increasingly more central banks, as an influence of the 
international financial institutions and the leading central bank practices. Central 
banks, one after the other, began to publish their analysis and assessment related 
to financial stability.
In addition to the publications presented above, the strengthening of the mac-
roprudential perspective of international financial organisations is reflected also 
by the creation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in 1999. The FSF was a 
consultation forum operating next to the BIS, consisting of the G7 finance minis-
ters and the governors of central banks. 
Besides the materials of BIS, IMF, and the central banks, several academic 
studies were published that emphasised the macroprudential nature of risk. A part 
of these pointed out the interconnectedness of the financial market participants 
and analysed the contagion risk (Allen – Gale 2000; Rochet – Tirole 1996). The 
exogenous or endogenous nature of risks too were increasingly accentuated and 
there have been arguments supporting that the latter may be more threatening, 
causing greater damage in terms of the financial system’s stability. Danielsson – 
Shin (2003) illustrated this point using the case of trading strategies on the money 
and capital markets. When traders use the same risk management models, that 
represent the best practice of the industry, their decisions become harmonised, 
that is, the models dictate the same behavioural pattern to everyone. When market 
prices are falling, it affects the behaviour of traders. If the strategies applied by 
market players are similar, then their reactions will be similar, i.e. harmonised. 
The harmonised behaviour has a retroactive effect on market prices (e.g. in the 
form of closing positions en masse), resulting in a further price decrease. This 
can create a vicious circle that goes from the one-time price fall to the collapse of 
the market. Thus, the risk on the road to the collapse is generated and amplified 
within the system.
Despite all the intellectual efforts described above, nothing of this filtered 
down to the practice of bank regulation and supervision. Although the strength-
3  The core set of indicators contained 15 aggregated microprudential indicators by the follow-
ing criteria: capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and profitability, liquidity, and sensitivity 
to market risks. The five groups of indicators are built according to the quantifiable compo-
nents of the so-called CAMELS method used by the FED for supervisory purposes.
4  The 26 additional indicators contained a mix of macroeconomic, aggregated banking system 
data, as well as aggregated data related to other financial institutions.
298 KATALIN MÉRŐ
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
ening of the macroprudential perspective can be tied to specific financial crises, 
the consequences stayed on a conceptual level. And in practice, the direction 
of the evolution was marked by the development of the new regulatory system, 
the Basel II rules, based dominantly on the microprudential perspective, i.e. the 
banks’ best practices in risk management. Table 2 summarises the development 
of macroprudential ideas and regulatory tools during this period.
3. THE BANK REGULATION’S RESPONSE TO THE GFC: 
THE MACROPRUDENTIAL TURN
The GFC has fundamentally changed the attitude of politicians and regulators 
towards macroprudential risks. As Claudio Borio wrote, macroprudence evolved 
from a concept used in a small circle into a key concept, from a concept of exclu-
sively theoretical significance into a part of daily life, the most important direc-
tion of the bank regulation and supervision’s evolution. Or, as he pointed out par-
aphrasing Milton Friedman, “We are all macroprudentialists now” (Borio 2011: 
2). The widespread usage of the expression “macroprudential” is a consequence 
of the GFC as well (Galati – Moessner 2011).
As we have seen in Section 2, the macroprudential perspective as well as the 
potential toolset of the macroprudential regulation were well-known concepts, but 
only of a theoretical significance until 2008. As an effect of the GFC, implemen-
Table 2. Development of macroprudential ideas and regulatory tools, from the late 1990s 
to the GFC
Ideas Regulatory tools
September 2000: speech of A. Crockett distinguished 
the macro- and microprudential dimensions of financial 
stability
No
October 2000: BIS conference “Marrying the macro- 
and microprudential dimensions of financial stability” 
The idea of macroprudential regulation 
articulated
IMF and World Bank launch the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) from 1999; and work 
out the underlying methodology: Macroprudential 
Indicators (MPI)
No
Borio (2003) theoretical foundation of macro- and 
microprudential concepts
No
Several papers on macroprudential risks within the 
whole period
No
Extensive critiques of Basel II because of its 
microprudential perspective
No: Basel II regulatory reform 
represents almost solely 
microprudential approach 
(first draft: 1999; final draft: 2004)
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tation of a bank regulation based on the macroprudential perspective appeared 
increasingly more often as a generally accepted requirement. Books, articles, and 
studies about clarifying the definition of the regulation with a macroprudential 
perspective, or some of its special individual elements, and about the possible 
methods of applying the macroprudential regulation appeared one after the other, 
in much higher numbers than before (Galati – Moessner 2011; Kálmán 2015).
Besides the economists and the regulatory authorities, the macropruden-
tial perspective became part of the palette of interests of the political economy, 
marking a turn in changing the regulation’s conceptual framework. Baker (2013) 
pointed out that before the GFC, bank regulation was built essentially on the as-
sumption of efficient financial markets and the microprudential regulation based 
on it, while after the crisis, faith in market efficiency wavered and the need for 
a much more active state and state regulation that would intervene to prevent 
a crisis became essential. The growing awareness of the need for active state 
intervention and its legitimacy brought a turn of perspective in bank regulation 
(Mérő – Piroska 2013).
As an effect of the turn, efforts to support the establishment and implemen-
tation of national macroprudential policies have strengthened on international 
level. The volume and significance of macroprudential tools applied by the cen-
tral banks and financial supervisory authorities of individual states have also 
increased considerably. Additionally, the general implementation of macropru-
dential regulation has become one of the main objectives in the renewal of the 
international bank regulation, the Basel III regulatory system.
3.1. Evolution of the institutional framework for macroprudential regulation 
and supervision
As part of the macroprudential turn, the system of institutions supporting the 
implementation of the macroprudential perspective has been established. The re-
sponsibility to establish, coordinate, and implement macroprudential policies has 
been assigned as follows: the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on a global level, 
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on a European level, the designated 
national authorities (usually the central banks) and, although to a lesser extent, 
the competent national supervisory authorities on national levels.5
5  The concept of national “designated authorities” entrusted with the conduct of macropruden-
tial policy, different from the “competent authorities” responsible for banking supervision, 
was based on the Recommendation of the ESRB (ESRB/2011/3) on the macroprudential man-
date of national authorities.
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The first quick reaction of the international regulatory community to the GFC 
was to establish the FSB on the basis of the FSF in April 2009. The international 
community acknowledged with this step that the FSF operating since 1999 was 
able to fulfil its objective of supporting financial stability to a quite limited ex-
tent only. This was partly due to its coverage limited to the G7 and partly to its 
weak mandate, exclusively for consultations (Helleiner 2010). The G20s and 
four other countries operating as important financial centres (Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Spain, and Switzerland) became members of the FSB. As a consequence, 
in principle, if the FSB agreed on a particular financial stability policy, those 
rules could be introduced in a group of countries covering a much larger part of 
the international financial markets. Besides the member states, four international 
institutions (BIS, IMF, World Bank, OECD) as well as the six international stand-
ard-setting bodies that are the most important in terms of the financial system, 
the BCBS, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO ), 
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) among them, became 
also members of the FSB.
The FSB performs its coordination and monitoring task along four main re-
forms laid down by the G20s and defined as priorities. The priorities cover the 
activities performed at international standard-setting bodies, primarily at BCBS 
and IOSCO, which are considered most important by the G20s. These are as fol-
lows: (a) higher capital requirements, lower leverage, and better risk management 
and corporate governance; (b) ending the too-big-to-fail6 status; (c) increasing the 
safety of derivative markets; and (d) transforming the shadow banking system 
(FSB 2015). 
Besides coordinating the activities of the international standard-setting bodies, 
the FSB issued several recommendations: guidance for assessing the systemic 
importance of financial institutions, guidance for decreasing the reliance on cred-
it rating agencies, a policy framework for strengthening oversight, regulation of 
shadow banking, etc.7
Despite its manifold mandates, the FSB did not become an institution playing 
a defining role in the area of analysing, coordinating, implementing, and apply-
ing macroprudential policies in the first period of its existence (Hellenier 2010). 
However, the numerous documents related to the situation and degree of imple-
mentation of financial reforms published on its website support the transparency 
of international processes and of national macroprudential regulations.
6  The meaning of the too-big-to-fail status and the importance of its termination will be covered 
in the presentation of the macroprudential toolset (Section 3.2).
7  Guidelines about the consistent interpretation and application of the international standards 
are available on the FSB website: http://www.fsb.org/publications/policy-documents/ 
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Following the collapse of Lehmann Brothers, not only the G20s, but also the 
EU had to urgently react to the challenges of the GFC. In October 2008, the 
European Commission (EC) requested the high-level expert committee led by 
Jacques de Larosière to draw the lessons learnt from the crisis for the financial 
regulation and supervision. The result of their work, the De Larosière Report, 
was published in March 2009. The main conclusion of the report was that there 
is an urgent need to establish a macroprudential financial supervision in Eu-
rope, and it made a recommendation to set up a European Systemic Risk Council 
(ESRB). As part of the European System of Financial Supervision, the ESRB, 
founded in November 2010, is the institution responsible for the macroprudential 
oversight of the Union’s financial system. Besides collecting and analysing data 
to identify and rank systemic risks, the ESRB issues warnings and recommenda-
tions for corrective measures, and it monitors whether they are implemented. 
Besides the ESRB, further institutions of macroprudential supervision in the 
EU are the designated national authorities (see footnote 5); to a lesser extent, the 
competent national supervisory authorities, mostly in the area of operative as-
pects, and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) within the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) with special mandates. The designated authority responsible for 
establishing and implementing the macroprudential policy of a given country is 
defined individually by each country, in accordance with the ESRB recommen-
dation no. 2011/3. According to the survey of the Advisory Scientific Committee 
operating next to the ESRB (ESRB 2014b), covering the 28 EU member states 
plus the European Banking Union, the institutional depositaries of the macro-
prudential mandate for financial stability, i.e. the designated authorities, are in 
most cases the central banks, both in the euro zone and outside of it (a total of 19 
countries plus the Banking Union belong to this group). Denmark is the single 
country where the designated authority is the Ministry of Finance. The financial 
supervisory authorities play this role in five countries in the euro zone (Austria, 
Germany, Finland, Latvia, and Luxembourg) and in Sweden; in Romania, the 
central bank is responsible for macroprudence with regard to banks and the fi-
nancial supervisory authority with regard to investment companies. France and 
Poland designated not an institution, but an inter-institutional committee for this 
purpose. The EU bank regulation ties the implementation of the macroprudential 
measures of designated authorities and competent supervisory authorities to the 
prior notification of the ESRB and, in some cases, to the approval of the EC with 
prior consultation of the ESRB. The ESRB publishes the received notifications 
and a clear summary of national macroprudential measures in a table format on 
its website, which greatly contributes to their transparency. 
As the vicious circle of sovereign and bank insolvency became obvious with 
the spread of GFC in the EU and the burden of bailing out individual countries 
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and their banking systems shifted to the European level, the recognition that re-
sponsibility on a European level can be taken only for risks controlled on the level 
of a Union has become stronger. This led to the creation of the European Banking 
Union, and within that, as a first step, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
Thus, the Banking Union is an institution that has been established with a mac-
roprudential perspective, although the SSM has an essentially microprudential 
mandate (Mérő – Piroska 2013). However, the microprudential tasks of the SSM 
are complemented with several macroprudential mandates. The distribution of 
macroprudential mandates within the EU is presented in Table 3.
3.2. Tools of macroprudential bank regulation
As Crockett emphasised already in 2000, the difference between macro- and mi-
croprudential regulatory tools is not a difference in the tools themselves, but rath-
er the perspective applied in the calibration of the same tool. The macroprudential 
regulatory tools include all regulatory provisions that decrease the build-up of 
macroprudential risks either in their cross-sectional or their time dimension, and/
or the tools that increase the banks’ macroprudential shock-absorbing capacity. 
These two possible approaches (i.e. decrease the risk or increase the resilience) 
also highlight that the applied definition of macroprudential perspective is not 
8  CRR: Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; CRD: Directive 2013/36/EU. Based on Basel III, the 
Regulation and the Directive together are the post-crisis bank regulatory framework in the EU.
Table 3. Macroprudential mandates in EU
Institution Mandate Scope
ESRB EU wide mandate based on regulation 
1092/2010 EU.
All EU member states
Designated national 
authorities
National mandates based on CRR and 
CRD8 and all the other macroprudential 
mandates, not regulated on the EU 
level. 
All EU member states
Competent national 
supervisory authorities
National mandates based on CRR and 
CRD.
All EU member states
ECB’s Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (the SSM)
The right to approve all the 
macroprudential tools of national 
authorities. In addition, the ECB has 
the right to determine higher capital 
buffers and stringent macroprudential 
measures instead of the ones suggested 
by national authorities. 
Banking Union member 
states
MACROPRUDENTIAL BANK REGULATION 303
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
completely clear yet, and this may obviously affect the calibration of the applied 
tools (Borio 2014).
In 2010, the IMF conducted a survey covering 49 countries and the ECB, as-
sessing what macroprudential tools individual countries apply in their practice 
(IMF 2011). Based on the survey and a few country case studies, Lim et al. (2011) 
identified 10 widely used regulatory tools. These are the following: 
(a) four lending-related tools (maximum Loan-to-Value ratio for mortgage 
loans; maximum Debt-to-Income ratio for maximising households’ debt repay-
ment burden; limits related to lending in foreign currencies; and caps on lending 
or on the increase of lending); 
(b) three liquidity-related tools (FX open position limits; rules related to matu-
rity mismatch; and liquidity reserve/buffer requirements); and 
(c) three capital-related tools (anticyclical/time variant capital requirement; 
dynamic/time variant provisioning; and restrictions on dividend payments). 
The survey revealed that some countries (first of all emerging market econo-
mies, e.g. China, India, Croatia and Serbia) introduced macroprudential regula-
tory tools already before the GFC. After the outbreak of the GFC, one or more 
macroprudential rules had appeared in the practices of almost all countries, much 
before the elaboration and acceptance of the related internationally harmonised 
measures.
In the following, we shall review the tools of macroprudential bank regulation, 
grouped by the cross-sectional and time dimensions. We take into account only 
the macroprudential rules that are defined in Basel III and in the almost complete-
ly identical EU rules, the CRR and the CRD, in force since January 1, 2014.9 
The objective of the macroprudential regulation in the cross-sectional dimen-
sion is the termination of the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) status, in accordance with 
the previously outlined preference of the FSB, and the avoidal of the simultaneous 
and concentrated build-up of identical risks in the banking system, which become 
endogenous this way (alternative definition: increasing the shock-absorbing ca-
pacity of banks originating from these risks).
The TBTF status refers to the authorities’ practice that – in case of a problem – 
they bail out the largest banks, with the objective to avoid the loss of trust in the 
banking system and serious disturbances in the functioning of the economy. The 
TBTF status incents the banks to higher risk-taking that creates moral hazard and 
destroys incentives for prudent banking. During the GFC, the bail-out packages 
provided to banks with TBTF status required huge amounts of money from the 
9  The review of the macroprudential rules of the EU by instruments can be found in the so-
called Flagship Report (ESRB 2014a) as well. 
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taxpayers. This indicated that these banks had grown so large before the crisis10 
that in case of their bankruptcy, they would require help that exceeds the bearing 
capacity of their home countries, i.e. they have become practically impossible to 
save. The requirement to abolish the TBTF status was formulated for this reason. 
The regulation distinguishes two groups of banks with a special systemic impor-
tance: banks representing systemic risk at the level of the global financial system 
and banks carrying systemic risks at the national level. The regulation prescribes 
additional capital requirements for both types of institutions in order to decrease 
their probability of default and the loss given their possible default. The method-
ology for determining globally significant banks is legally consistent on the EU 
level and the definition of additional requirements based on this is mandatory; 
at the same time, it is optional for the designated national authorities concerning 
institutions that are systemically important on the domestic market.11
In the current system, the regulation has three tools for handling identical risks 
occurring simultaneously. (1) The regulation calls for meeting two new liquidity 
ratios. (2) The possibility to prescribe a so-called systemic risk capital buffer. This 
happens when the designated national authority considers that excessive risks are 
building up in the financial system as a whole, or in one or more subgroups of it. 
The additional capital requirement is valid only for those institutions in whose 
case simultaneously building up risks have been identified. (3) The additional 
capital requirement within the framework of the Supervisory Review and Evalu-
ation Process (SREP) for institutions where excess risks of identical nature are 
building up in a given period. Besides these three tools serving for managing the 
cross-sectional risks, the Basel Committee developed one additional tool, to be 
implemented in the future, that is not yet present in the EU regulation. This is the 
capital requirement for potential trading losses of banks (i.e. for market risk). It 
was necessary because although the models used currently measured the potential 
losses properly in calm periods, they were unable to cope with the massive price 
falls unfolding in periods of market collapse that resulted in a downward price 
spiral, i.e. with endogenous risks. The planned new regulation means a complete 
turn of perspective in the sense that the models to be used are building on the 
presumption of market turbulences rather than assuming calm markets12. 
 10  The balance sheet total of the largest EU banks exceeded or came near to the GDP of their 
home Member State. For example, the largest EU bank in 2011 was Deutsche Bank, with 
a balance sheet total representing 84.8% of the German GDP, the second was HSBC, with a 
balance sheet total corresponding to 119.8% of Great Britain’s GDP (Liikanen 2012).
11  Mérő (2013) gives an overview on the banks’ motivations for achieving the TBTF status and 
on the rationale for different regulatory ideas and tools. 
12  The new regulatory model is the “expected shortfall”, that measures the average market loss 
that exceeds the given confidence level (BCBS 2016).
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Multiple regulatory tools have been incorporated into the Basel and the Eu-
ropean rules as well to decrease the time dimension of macroprudential risks, 
i.e. the procyclical behaviour of banks too. On the one hand, these are capital 
rules with the objective that the banks should accumulate an appropriate capital 
buffer, exceeding the regulatory minimum in the upward course of the cycle. The 
decrease of the buffer during the downward course of the cycle ensures that the 
bank will have the regulatory minimum capital even in bad times. This category 
includes the capital conservation buffer that is equally valid for all banks and 
prescribes the creation of additional capital in a way that no payment of dividends 
or bonuses can be performed from the bank’s profit until the buffer requirement 
has not been met. In a recession, when the bank has no profit, this limitation is 
obviously not effective. On the other hand, this category includes the provision to 
create countercyclical capital buffer. The banks have to create it only in case the 
designated national authorities require it because they consider that an excessive 
credit growth unfolded in the given country. The additional capital requirement 
prescribed in such periods can reduce the credit growth itself, while the capital 
buffer can help cover the risks when the lending conditions become unfavour-
able. The limitation of the banks’ leverage (i.e. the unweighted ratio of capital and 
balance sheet total) also belongs to this category.13 In the case of residential mort-
gage and consumer loans, the national regulatory authorities have further anticy-
clical tools. There is no mandatory Basel or EU provision for these tools, but the 
national authorities can apply them in their own competence. These include the 
loan-to-value (LTV) limits for mortgage loans and the payment-to-income (PTI)-
type requirements related to the income coverage of both the mortgage and the 
consumer loans’ instalment. Table 4 gives an overview of the macroprudential 
regulatory tools in cross sectional and time dimension. 
Besides the tools listed above, the stress testing exercises both by the indi-
vidual banks and by the designated and supervisory authorities can promote the 
macroprudential perspective too. Stress tests assume unfavourable economic 
scenarios to be able to prepare for them. Depending on the scenarios applied, 
the perspective of stress tests can be either microprudential or macroprudential. 
The macroprudential view for stress testing also have been strengthened after the 
GFC. In the EU, the European Banking Authority regularly performs EU-wide 
stress tests with the aim of identifying risks and vulnerabilities in a micropru-
dential perspective. However, since the GFC, the designated national authorities 
(mainly the central banks) regularly conduct stress test with a macroprudential 
perspective as well. 
13 For the procyclical nature of leverage, see Adrian – Shin (2010).
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4. CONCLUSIONS: ARE MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND 
SUPERVISION CAPABLE OF STABILISING THE BANKING SYSTEM?
The GFC has brought a radical turn in bank regulation: the previous, solely mi-
croprudential perspective has been replaced by the general spread of the macro-
prudential perspective. The authorities responsible for financial regulation and the 
markets now strongly believe that a macroprudential perspective and regulation 
will be able to protect the financial stability in the future. They also believe that if 
the system of institutions and rules created for this purpose works well, crises of 
a depth similar to that of the GFC can be avoided in the future.
Since the recurring cyclical crises have formed a part of the economic history 
for centuries and the endogenous risks of the financial markets have also found 
various newer forms of appearance as a result of financial innovation and pos-
sibilities of regulatory arbitrage, we have to raise the question of whether the 
macroprudential perspective and regulatory system that is currently in place are 
really able to prevent large financial crises?
Borio (2014) draws the attention to the fact that no matter how important and 
good tool the macroprudential regulation is, we should not have too high ex-
pectations towards it. As we also pointed out earlier, even the objective of the 
Table 4. Macroprudential regulatory tools in the European Union
Dimension of risk Macroprudential regulatory tool Aim of the regulation
Cross sectional
Capital buffers for globally and 
domestically systemically important 
banks 
Building up excess capital buffer 
for the systemically important banks 
and for the macroprudential risks.
Systemic risk buffer
Obligatory liquidity ratios Decrease the dependence on 
financial markets both for short 
and long run in order to ensure 
the liquidity. 
SREP capital requirement above 
the minimum (mixed micro- and 
macroprudential aim)
To ensure capital coverage for given 
types of risks for given groups of 
banks.
Planned new perspective for market 
risk capital requirement
Using market risk models that could 
incorporate the endogenous risks of 
markets.
Time
Countercyclical capital buffer To accumulate excess capital in 
periods of credit growth 
and profitable banking.
Capital conservation buffer
Limiting leverage To limit excessive leverage in 
periods of boom.
LTV and PTI limits for retail 
lending
To limit excessive household credit 
growth and indebtedness.
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macroprudential regulation can be formulated in two ways: it can either be di-
rected towards decreasing the risk, or towards increasing the macroprudential 
shock-absorbing capacity of banks. For example, an objective with regard to the 
time dimension of macroprudential risks can be to increase the banks’ resistance 
to cyclical risks, or to limit the cyclical upswings. Borio’s opinion is that a mac-
roprudential regulation is more likely to achieve the former rather than the latter. 
The same way, he does not think it is a realistic expectation that macroprudential 
regulation should support the increase of lending in the downward course of the 
cycle – only the mitigation of the excessive scaling-back of lending can be re-
garded as a much more realistic goal.
Admati (2016) goes much farther in formulating the doubts. According to her, 
the Basel III capital regulation system is nothing else but a missed opportunity 
with regard to regulations aimed at establishing a stable banking system since the 
capital level of the banking system remains critically low. In her opinion, the fact 
that banks can operate with a high leverage has not changed after the crisis since 
banking continues to be the industry with the highest leverage with its limit of 
three or five percent. This continues to stimulate risk-taking with other people’s 
money. In her opinion, the high leverage is a result of the bankers’ high negotiat-
ing power since this way, the positive results of risks taken by the bank continue 
to be theirs, and they only share the negative results with the bank’s creditors.
The Vice-Chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee of the ESRB, Hellwig 
(2014) also emphasises the insufficiency of the leverage limits. He points out that 
if, for example, a bank’s capital is 3% of its balance sheet total, a one percent loss 
of the assets wipes out one-third of its capital. Therefore, it should decrease its as-
set portfolio by roughly a third. If its capital were 20% of the balance sheet total, 
it would have to reduce its assets by only five percent because of the same shock. 
That is, the banking system would be safe only with a much lower leverage.
The above standpoints clearly illustrate that the clarification of the macro-
prudential regulation’s framework and the assessment of its efficiency are yet to 
come. Nobody knows whether the set targets can be achieved with their help or 
not, moreover, in some cases, the set targets are somewhat ambiguous. Neither 
do we know whether the new rules are properly calibrated; what possibilities for 
regulatory arbitrage (still unknown today) they create; will the interaction be-
tween macroprudential and monetary policy create synergy or contradiction; and 
what risks can build up in the future if they are used. The competition from un-
regulated shadow banking institutions makes the last point especially emphatic. 
Even though we do not have proper answers to these questions as yet, we agree 
with those who express strong doubts as to whether macroprudenial regulation, 
in its present form, indeed creates a Brave New World. 
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